Hope, and good sense, returned in the form of Howard Wilkinson in 1988. After
just two seasons at the helm, the Sheffield
man had the club back in the First Division and contending for silverware. In
1992, after a mere two years in the top-flight, Leeds were champions of the First Division. True
to form, United followed-up their achievement with a 17th-place finish a year later.
A rebound of sorts saw Leeds earn 5th-place finishes in 1994 and 1995.
It was their best showing under Wilkinson in the new English Premier League, however.
After concluding the 1996-1997 season in the bottom half of the table and losing to Aston Villa in the FA Cup Final,
Wilkinson was shown the door and succeeded by George Graham after a heavy loss to Manchester United the following autumn. Graham’s appointment came with no shortage of controversy. The future Spurs boss was fresh off a one-year ban for taking illegal payments from a football agent. After a single season at United, he was off to White Hart Lane.
In 2000, under David O’Leary, Leeds produced their best-ever Premiership result.
The 3rd-place finish, however, was spoiled when defender Jonathan Woodgate and midfielder Lee Bowyer were
involved in a bust-up which left a student in hospital. The result was an extended
2-year court battle and the transfers of both players in 2003.
Still, their rank in the table ensured a Champions’ League berth ahead of the 2000-2001 season. As it turned out, Leeds’ progress in the competition seemed too good to be true. They advanced all the way to the semi-final round and a tie with Valencia. Buoyed by the accomplishment, chairman
Peter Risdale withdrew substantial loans against the following season’s Champions’ League revenue. It seemed a reasonable risk at the time.
However, a late-season skid saw Leeds drawn into a three-way battle for 3rd-spot.
In the end, Gerrard Houllier’s Liverpool pipped United for the final Champions’ League place by a single point. Risdale was unable to repay the debt; and, as a result, sold Rio Ferdinand to Manchester United for 30M-pounds. The sale of the young England defender came as a devastating blow. O’Leary’s
fury at the transaction led to his sacking in June of 2002.
Terry Venables was hired the following month. From the get-go, his rift
with key midfielders Olivier Dacourt and David Batty looked to have the club heading in the wrong direction. After premature eliminations from both domestic cups, Jonathan Woodgate was sold to Newcastle in the January transfer period as the club continued to languish in debt.
Venables was outraged at the sale of his best defender, fell-out with Risdale, and was fired in March. Risdale, himself, resigned later that year.
Ahead of the 2003-2004 campaign, Gerald Krasner and a conglomerate of businessmen assumed control of Leeds United. With Krasner serving as chairman, the club underwent a massive sell-off of assets
and players to finance its debt payments. Despite the efforts of manager Eddie
Gray, the club finished second from bottom and was relegated to the League Championship – the squad reduced to barely
a skeleton of a football team.
The liquidation process continued well into the following summer. Remaining
players were jettisoned at bargain-basement prices, the training-ground was auctioned-off, and Elland Road was sold ahead of the 2004-2005 season. The following January,
Krasner sold a 50% stake in the club to Ken Bates for 10M-pounds.
Bates, the current chairman, will face the music when the future of Leeds United is determined by its creditors on
Friday. In all likelihood, the football club will survive and commence play in
the third tier of English football for the first time in its history. It is hardly
a flattering set of circumstances.
For one thing, it appears unlikely that the team will survive its lower-league existence in the cavernous Elland Road. One can hardly imagine that Leeds will
bounce back into the Championship a year from now. A smaller, sleeker ground
would serve as a far more realistic home to a club in desperate need of a makeover.
To that effect, Bates and the board of directors should be careful not to pressure Dennis Wise, or whoever the manager
is in August, into making the sort of band-aid transactions intended to garner an immediate bounce-back into the Championship. The manager should be given adequate time to assemble an appropriate squad. In other words, Leeds must recognize that, for now, their reality lies in 3rd-tier football.
If the club is ever going to make a return to respectability, they must make changes on three fronts. Firstly, they should temporarily abandon Elland Road for a smaller venue. It would be far more becoming of a
League One side to fill a more modest ground than to have their current stadium half-filled week after week. They could still host cup matches at Elland Road. But, for the time being, a ground-swap is in the club’s
best interest.
Secondly, the manager should build a squad from scratch. Instead of trying
to lure expensive veterans in hopes of pushing into the Championship, his concentration should be geared toward stocking-up
on talented youngsters. In so doing, he will be economically staffing the squad
and, more importantly, growing assets from within.
Finally, the board should make financial stability its primary goal. Forget
about quick promotions and cinderella cup runs. Leeds United should focus on
becoming and remaining competitive in League One. Their immediate ambition should
be to contend among the likes of Oldham, Yeovil, and Nottingham Forest – not Arsenal, Chelsea, and Manchester
United. This is where a small stadium and younger, cheaper squad all intertwine. The organization as a whole must become sleek and downsized. The club’s following is large and loyal and will return after the re-building process.
As humiliating as the current situation is for the club’s staff and supporters, in truth, Leeds United has never
been operated with any substantial degree of competence or stability. Their relegation
and current financial turmoil is, if nothing else, the ideal opportunity for the club to re-invent itself. Ken Bates and his board will lead the organization down one of two roads – to a Leeds City-styled
implosion or a slow, effective, top-to-bottom revolution.